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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
cumstances in which the parties had not clearly agreed in their contract to
arbitrate the particular dispute. 75 Gateway stands as a vigorous reaffirmation
of a strong federal policy in favor of binding arbitration of labor disputes.
Anthony Allen Geyelin
LABOR LAW - UNAUTHORIZED STRIKES - UNION HAS THE DUTY
TO USE EVERY REASONABLE MEANS AVAILABLE TO END WILDCAT
STRIKE.
Eazor Express, Inc. v. Teamsters Union (W.D. Pa. 1973)
Plaintiff employers, Eazor Express, Inc. (Eazor) and Daniels Motor
Freight Co. (Daniels), brought suit in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania' against the International Brother-
hood of Teamsters (the International) and Locals 249 and 3772 seeking
damages for breach of a no-strike clause in their collective bargaining
agreements.
3
75. In both Boys Markets and Lucas Flour the union's contractual duty to arbi-
trate the dispute in question was not contested, and there was language in both
opinions which appeared to attach some significance to this fact. See 398 U.S. at 254;
369 U.S. at 105, 106. Before Gateway, it had been suggested that the presumption of
arbitrability should not be applied by a court considering whether an injunction should
issue. See Note, Labor Injunctions, Boys Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitra-
bility, 85 HARV. L. REV. 636, 640 (1972).
1. Eazor Express, Inc. v. Teamsters, 357 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Pa. 1973). The
employers brought suit in federal court pursuant to section 301 of the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
2. Local 377 and Local 249 were the exclusive bargaining agents for employees
at Daniels' Warren, Ohio terminal, and Eazor's Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania terminal,
respectively. 357 F. Supp. at 161. Eazor's suit against the International and Local
249 and Daniels' suit against the International and Local 377 were consolidated for
trial on the issue of liability. Id. at 161 n.2. The damages issues were litigated sepa-
rately. 376 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
3. Eazor, Daniels, Locals 377 and 249, and the National Over-The-Road and
City Cartage Policy and Negotiating Committee of the International (hereinafter
National Committee) were signatories of the National Master Freight Agreement
covering the period from April 1, 1967 through March 31, 1970. Eazor, Local 249,
and the National Committee were signatories of the Joint Council No. 40, Freight
Division Over-The-Road Supplemental Agreement and the Joint Council 40, Freight
Division Local Cartage Supplemental Agreement. Daniels, Local 377, and the National
Committee were signatories of the Central States Area Over-The-Road Supplemental
Agreement, with Ohio Rider, and the Central States Area Local Cartage Supple-
mental Agreement [hereinafter Central States Area supplements]. Id. at 161.
The National Master Freight Agreement, to which all parties were signa-
tories, contained a "no-strike" clause which stated:
The Union[s] and the Employers agree that there shall be no strike, lockout,
tie-up, or legal proceedings without first using all possible means of settlement,
as provided for in this Agreement [and in the National Agreement, if applicable]
of any controversy which might arise.
Id. at 161, quoting National Master Freight Agreement (footnote omitted). The
Central State Area supplements between Daniels, the National Committee, and Local
377 contained an express duty to "undertake every reasonable means to induce
[striking] employees to return to their jobs during any [unauthorized strike]." 357
F. Supp. at 162, quoting Article 43, Section 2 of the Central States Area supplements.
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In August 1968, Daniels discharged two Local 377 members for re-
fusing work assignments. When the discharges were not rescinded, 4 Local
377 employees walked off their jobs at the Daniels terminal. Efforts by
both the Local and International to induce the men to return to work '-
proved futile and pickets spread to Eazor's terminal where Local 249 mem-
bers honored and supported the lines despite orders to work issued by the
president of Local 249 who had been instructed by the International to
give the orders because the strikes were illegal. The strikes, characterized
by roving bands of pickets and by substantial violence,0 continued until the
strikers were discharged at Daniels' Warren terminal and the terminal was
closed. Subsequently, however, Local 249 members voted to end the strike
against the Eazor terminal.7
Upon consideration of the issues, the Western District determined that
it would be advantageous to bifurcate the trial and consider the issue of
liability separately from the issue of damages." As to the former issue, the
court held that the International and both Locals, as signatories of a col-
lective bargaining agreement containing the no-strike clause, had the implied
duty to use every reasonable means to end the unauthorized strikes and
that the duty was not discharged when the unions merely urged their mem-
bers to return to work when other reasonable means were available. Eazor
Express, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 357 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
While there is a paucity of case law in this area, it has been established
that a union will be liable for damages resulting from an unlawful strike
if the union affirmatively or impliedly acquiesces in the employees' actions.9
4. The union representative designated as having the union's authority to call
strikes pursuant to the Central States Area supplements met with the discharged
employees and Daniels' manager on August 20. There was conflicting testimony as
to whether he threatened a strike or cautioned against one, but the court found that
the union representative had cautioned against the strike. 357 F. Supp. at 162-63.
5. The designated union representative instructed a union steward to tell the
men to return to work and, on two occasions, personally ordered the picketers to
return to work. Id. at 163, 165.
6. Id. at 161. The court did not provide a detailed decision of the acts of the
violence involved.
7. Id. at 166-69. Subsequent attempts to end the strike failed. On August 21,
an official of Joint Council No. 41 sent two men to Local 377's designated union
representative to assist in ending the strike and an International organizer went to
Eazor's Pittsburgh terminal to urge the strikers to return to work. The Joint Council
official arranged to expedite the discharged employees' grievances. He and the
Local 377 representative met with a number of strikers on September 3, but again
the men could not be persuaded to return to work. International representatives also
addressed the strikers, imploring them to return to work and explaining that the
International could not aid them until work resumed. On September 17, the Inter-
national summoned the strike leaders to Washington and read them the "riot act."
Id.
8. Id. at 161.
9. Vulcon Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers, 430 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1970).
In that case, the court cited as an example of the unions' acquiescence the failure of
the union leaders to inform the employees about a new gate that was being constructed
which would have permitted Vulcan employees to proceed to work without interference
from the strikers picketing the primary employer. Instead, the union leaders urged
the employees to return to work, but also stated that they would not cross the picket
lines. Id. at 454.
It should be noted that the Eazor court used 'wildcat' to refer to a strike
not authorized by union officials rather than to one not authorized by the collective
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In United Construction Workers v. Haislip Baking Co.,10 which involved
facts similar to those of Eazor, the court held that a union could not be
held accountable for an unauthorized strike when employees voted not to
return to work unless the union was liable under the contract for strikes
which it had not authorized or sanctioned." Union members had engaged
in an unauthorized strike over the discharge of two employees, without
resorting to the mandatory arbitration procedure. Although the union
merely urged the employees to return to work, it was not liable for damages
since no implied duty to end the strike such as that recognized in Eazor was
found to exist.' 2
In finding such an implied duty, the Eazdr court obviously did not
follow the precedent of Haislip.1 The court justified its conclusion by
noting that the national labor policy is to promote the peaceful, private
resolution of disputes and that labor contracts must be read in the light
of that policy. 14 In addition, the court reasoned that Local 249 and the
International were bound under the National Master Freight Agreement
to prohibit strikes until the grievance mechanism of the contract had been
exhausted, 15 as indicated by the no-strike clause and the arbitration pro-
vision.' 6 Thus, to implement that purpose, it was deemed consonant with
the goal of industrial peace to imply an obligation on the part of unions to
employ whatever reasonable measures were available to end unauthorized
strikes.' 7
bargaining agreement 357 F. Supp. at 161 n.4. This definition complies with the
accepted used of the term. See NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199, 204 (4th Cir.
1944); Campbell v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 70 F. Supp. 996, 1002 (W.D.
Pa. 1947).
10. 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955).
11. 223 F.2d at 879.
12. Id. at 877-78.
13. It is arguably possible to reconcile the two cases. See text accompanying
notes 22-24 infra.
14. 357 F. Supp. at 165.
15. See note 3 supra. The International contended that it was not a party to
the collective bargaining agreements because it had not signed them and because a
disclaimer at the end of each agreement relieved it of any possible liability. The court
found that the International's National Committee was organizationally and function-
ally an administrative arm of the International; thus, the International was bound
to the agreements through its National Committee. Id. at 168. The disclaimer
relied on by the International states that the International approved of the agreement
as to form only and "in doing so [assumed] no liability whatsoever under [the
agreement] for the performance thereof or otherwise, and by such approval does not
become a party to [it]." Id. at 168 n.17, quoting all agreements. The court concluded
that since the International was a party through its National Committee, "any formal
disclaimers were mere ineffectual contrivances." 357 F. Supp. at 168.
16. The parties agreed that the grievance machinery had not been used. 357 F.
Supp. at 161 n.5.
17. The court quoted Refinery Employees' Union v. Continental Oil Co., 160
F. Supp. 723 (W.D. La. 1958):
. . . [C]ourts cannot make contracts for the parties, and can declare implied obli-
gations to exist only when there is a satisfactory basis in the express provisions of
the agreements which make it necessary to imply certain duties and obligations
in order to effect the purposes of the parties. Before an obligation will be implied
it must appear from the contract itself that it is so clearly in the contemplation
of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it, and therefore omitted
MAR CH 1974]
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After finding this implied duty, the court determined that the duty
had not been discharged by the unions in the instant case. The court
articulated all the available reasonable means which had not been utilized
in Eazor, stating that the International should have threatened strikers
with fines, suspension, or expulsion; proceeded to impose such discipline;
sent International representatives to urge dissidents to step aside to allow
other men to return to work; called meetings of strike leaders; and directed
strikers to vote by secret ballot. Furthermore, the locals should have
removed the stewards and committeemen who were leading and organizing
the strike and ensured that no strikers were employed elsewhere during the
strike.'8 The court concluded by saying that "the circumstances called for
politics of power rather than politics of persuasion."' 9
to do so, or that it is necessary to give effect to and effectuate the purpose of
the contract as a whole.
357 F. Supp. at 164, quoting 160 F. Supp. at 731. But see Industrial Trades Union v.
Woonsocket Dyeing Co., 122 F. Supp. 872, 875 (D.R.I. 1954), quoting Pawtucket
Mach. & Supply Corp. v. Monroe, 73 R.I. 162, 164, 154 A.2d 399, 400 (1947).
While the sole issue in Pawtucket was the construction of a contract, the court in
Industrial Trades Union utilized the Pawtucket rule of construction to interpret the
collective bargaining agreement in a suit to compel arbitration. The Pawtucket court
stated the rule to be:
The cardinal rule in construction of a written instrument is to read its language
in connection with the relative position and general purposes of the parties and
to gather from it, if one can, their intent as to the particular matter in dispute.
Id. at 164, 54 A.2d at 400.
Notice the conflict in the language. Refinery Employees' Union v. Continental
Oil Co., supra, stated that the implied language must be so clearly within the con-
templation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it, while
Pawtucket required merely that the language be read with the general purposes of
the parties in mind. The former test is restrictive, and only a true logical tautology
could meet it. Clearly Eazor would meet the Pawtucket test. Viewing the facts of
Eazor in terms of the restrictive test, however, it is unlikely that the obligations of
the International and Local 249 would include the duty to use every reasonable
means to end an unauthorized strike. The fact that Local 377 expressly included
such a duty in Article 43, Section 2 of the Central States Area supplements (See
note 3 supra) indicates that the duty was not so clearly in the contemplation of the
parties as expressed in the National Master Freight Agreement that they deemed
it unnecessary to express it. Yet, the court found that Local 249 and the International,
through the same National Master Freight Agreement had so clearly indicated their
intention that this duty was within the contemplation of the language as to make
its expression unnecessary in the Joint Council No. 40, Freight Division, Over-The-
Road Supplemental Agreement. 357 F. Supp. at 165.
18. 357 F. Supp. at 166-67.
19. Id. at 167. The court's finding in Eazor that the unions breached their
duty is puzzling in view of the particular facts involved. The International and Local
officers took great pains to encourage the strikers to return to work. See notes 5-6
and accompanying text supra. There is no evidence in the record that the unions
officially urged an end to the strike while unofficially encouraging its continuation.
See, e.g., Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. UMW, 436 F.2d 551 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 930 (1970), where union officials urged the strikers to return to work but
told them to "read between the lines." The court held the union liable for breach of
the collective bargaining agreement for discreetly urging the members to continue to
strike. 436 F.2d at 558-59. The Eazor court required more to discharge either an
express or an implied duty than at least one court has required to discharge an
express duty. In United Elastic Corp. v. NLRB, 84 NLRB 768 (1949), the union
expressly obligated itself to "loyally and in good faith endeavor to secure a return
of strikers to work to the end that the dispute may then be settled peaceably in
accordance with the procedure ... [in the agreement]." Id. at 770. Although the
union in United Elastic did begin formulation of a plan to persuade strikers to return
to work, the court held that in not explicitly asking them to go to work, the union
had not taken the affirmative action required by its express duty. Id. at 772. This
[VOL. 19
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Although in Eazor, unlike in Haislip, the court held the union liable for
damages arising out of the unauthorized strike, it is arguable that the de-
cision is consistent with Haislip if Eazor is read as holding that the implied
duty arises only where there is an express contractual duty imposed upon
the union to refrain from striking, as was the case in Eazor. However, it
is submitted that such a reading is incorrect on two grounds. First, the
Haislip court did not indicate that a presence of a no-strike clause would
have led it to reach a different result. In addition, the Haislip court stated
that by failing to settle the dispute through arbitration as required under
the contract, the union would be, in effect, in breach of the contract, even
were the no-strike clause not present.2 0 Second, even in the absence of a
no-strike clause, a duty not to strike still may be implicit in the contract. For
example, in Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 2 1 the Supreme Court
held that a no-strike clause will be implied if the dispute between the parties
is one subject to final and binding arbitration under the contract. 22 Hence,
in such situations, a reading of Eazor, restricting the implied duty to
situations wherein there is a no-strike clause in the collective bargaining
agreement would result in no imposition of an obligation on the union to
use every reasonable means to end a strike over an arbitrable grievance, a
result contrary to the court's apparent deference to the national policy of
cultivating the peaceful settlement of disputes. 23 Consequently, Eazor can-
not be reconciled with Haislip. The Eazor court undoubtedly would find
a duty to use every available means to end a strike in a Haislip-like situation
where compulsory arbitration was required under the collective bargaining
agreement, but where there was no express no-strike clause. 24
suggests that the union's duty would have been discharged had it directed the
strikers to return to work. The Eazor court, however, required the unions to do more
than urge the strikers to return to work.
20. The court stated: . . . [Tihe purpose of the contract was to require the
settlement of disputes and grievances by a procedure [mandatory arbitration] which
would not cause the disruption of business and ...a strike without following such
a procedure was necessarily a breach. 223 F.2d at 877.
21. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
22. Id. at 104-105.
23. See note 14 and accompanying text supra. This is consistent with the
statement in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), that the
employer is entitled to the "assurance of uninterrupted operation during the term of
the agreement." Id. at 454, quoting S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947).
24. It is submitted that this result is a probable but not an inevitable consequence
of Lucas Flour which did not involve a wildcat strike. A no-strike clause was
implied in Lucas Flour to effectuate the mandatory arbitration clause. However,
to hold a union liable for a wildcat strike would arguably require some affirmative
agreement on the part of the union not to strike. Such consent may be implied from
a no-strike clause. It is more difficult, however, to find that same implication solely
from a mandatory arbitration clause. It appears that Eazor would apply even if
a strike were not over an arbitrable dispute, as required for an employer to successfully
seek a "Boys Market" injunction. See Boys Market v. Retail Clerks Union, 398
U.S. 235 (1970). Boys Market required such an arbitrable dispute, holding that
where the parties have contractually agreed to arbitrate certain grievances, a strike
over such a grievance may be enjoined, thus forcing the parties to use the arbitration
machinery.
In the Eazor situation, however, the union's duty arises becaues of the no-
strike clause. Thus, any strike in violation of this clause, whether over an arbitrable
dispute or not, would give rise to the union's duty to use all reasonable means to
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In enumerating what means were available to end the strike, the Eazor
court stated neither whether the union had to exhaust all the remedial
measures before its implied duty was satisfactorily discharged, nor in what
order each measure should have been implemented. It is submitted that
since the implied duty was held to be contractual in nature, resort to all of
the means described by the court should be required of the union in order
for it to escape liability. Although it is arguable that the more severe
measures are applicable only when violence accompanies the strike, the
court, in failing to elaborate on the violent acts,25 implied that the presence
of violence was not critical to its holding and, therefore, every device
must be employed regardless. However, the presence or absence of violence
would appear to be relevant as a factor in determining when each remedial
measure should be implemented. For example, when substantial violence
is present, the more drastic measures of replacing the stewards leading the
strike and of fining members involved in the violence should be taken much
earlier in the strike. Without such violence, the union should be free
to use other methods first. Again, however, should the strike continue.
the union should exhaust the catalogued means in order to satisfy its
contractual duty.
Focusing upon the contractual nature of the duty raises the question
of whether or not the Eazor duty can be limited or eliminated contractually.
Its resolution requires a balancing of two basic policy considerations. On
the one hand lies the national policy favoring peaceful, private resolution
of labor disputes suggesting that the parties should not be permitted to
contract the duty away, since to allow that would be to discourage this
policy goal. On the other hand lies the fundamental right of liberty of
contract.2 6 In balancing these competing considerations, it must be re-
membered that both the mandatory arbitration provision and the no-strike
clause, two devices promoting peaceful, private resolution of disputes, exist
only as a result of contractual agreement and as such may be contractually
limited or ignored. Therefore, it is submitted that the Eazor duties, which
seemingly arise from contractual language, also may be contracted away.
A contrary result would be inconsistent with the court's contractual analysis.
The question of whether the duty has been discharged could be determined
by the grievance machinery should the parties so contract.
Organized labor can respond to Eazor in one of two ways. First,
unions can attempt to eliminate potential liability arising out of wildcat
strikes by bargaining no-strike clauses out of agreements. This result would
end the strike. However, where there is not a no-strike clause but there is a provisionfor binding arbitration, the union's liability, if any, under a synthesis of Lucas Flour
and Eazor would be limited to arbitrable disputes: in such a case, the no-strike clause
would be implied under Lucas Flour. As to other grievances, then, there would be
no contractual bar to a strike. Finally, of course, there would be no duty to use every
available means to end a strike when there is neither a no-strike clause nor a pro-
vision for binding arbitration.
25. See note 6 supra.
26. This doctrine was applied in a labor context in Refinery Employees' Union v.
Continental Oil Co., 160 F. Supp. 723 (W.D. La. 1958). See note 17 supra.
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